El autor analiza en este artículo el influjo del Papa Inocencio III en la consecución de la visctoria cristiana en la batalla de Las Navas de Tolosa y la proyección que tomó en España en las ideas de batalla y reconquista. Los elementos esenciales fueron: reforma de la Iglesia, el estableciemiento de la Paz y la propagación del cristianismo.
Though one might expect that education in the theology and philosophy of the Paris schools and in the Canon Law of Bologna might have bound them together, as a shared intellectual inheritance bound many others to the Pope, the archbishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada (1208-1247), exceptional Kirchenbild Innocenz'III (1198 -1216 , Stuttgart 1983, 20-45 . On Rodrigo's education, M. BALLESTEROS GAIBROIS, Don Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, Barcelona 1936, 34-5, 44 ; H. GRASSOTTI, «Don Rodrigo Ximénez de Rada, gran señor y hombre de negocios en la Castilla del siglo XIII: Cuadernos de Historia de España 55-6 (1972) 4; A. CASTRO, La Realidad Histórica de España, México 1954, 209-10. Rodrigo was still in Paris in April 1201 when he made his will promising to be buried at the monastery of Huerta (Cartulario del monasterio de Santa María de Huerta, éd. J. A. GARCIA LUJÁN, Monasterio de Santa María de Huerta 1981, no. 71, p. 113 2) Book VII, chapter 24: Rodrigo fumes because the Pope's intransigent insistence on the sacramentaUty of marriage had broken the incestuous marriage of Alfonso IX of León (1188 León ( -1230 and the infanta Berenguela, daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158-1214) and therefore, from Rodrigo's viewpoint. Innocent had scuppered the chances of peace between León and Castile and thus Innocent had halted the process of the Reconquista^. 3) Book IX, chapter 2: Rodrigo merely mentions that Innocent had prohibited the marriage of King Henry I of Castile (1214 Castile ( -1217 to the infanta Mafalda of Portugal. Innocent's letter of 1216 escapes direct censure and while Rodrigo might expect us to recall the result of Innocent's previous marital interference, the abandonment of this projected incestuous union, did not assume the same political importance, both because the situation against the Moors was no longer parlous and Henry's life was soon to be over^. 4) Book IX, chapter 9: Rodrigo recollects that Master Gonzalo García, the papal tax-collector in the Iberian Peninsula between 1213 and 1222, had been of the household of Innocent III. Gonzalo it was who had uncovered Rodrigo's misappropriation of the revenue raised from the crusading tax and hence earned the Archbishop the censure of Honorius III in 1220 and a demand for full payment of the same^.
Innocent III had plenty of detractors. From Walter von der Vogelweide's mild 'Oh, the Pope is too young. God, help your Christendom' to Giovanni Capocci's reported accusation 'Your words are God's words, but your works vols, Paris 1844-64 [hereafter MPLI, 215, cols. 550, 665; B Valencia 1975, 102-5; LlNEHAN, History and the Historians, 389-90; D. SMITH, Innocent III and Aragon-Catalonia: Studies on Papal Power, University of Birmingham PH.D Thesis 1997, 36-94. 4 DRH, Bk. VII, c. 24, p. 247: MDHI. no. 138. pp. 168-70, no. 196, pp. 209-15, no. 276, pp. 305-6, no. 299, p. 332, no. 305, pp. 336-9, no. 331, p. 358 ; J. GONZÁLEZ, El reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII, 3 vols, Madrid 1960, 1, 723-5; IDEM, Alfonso IX, 2 vols, Madrid 1944, 1, 95-120; LlNEHAN, History and the Historians, 256-9 III (1216 III ( -1227 , éd. D. MANSILLA, Rome 1965 [hereafter MDHI, no. 103, p. 84; GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII, 1, 753; IDEM, Alfonso DC, 1. 163-4. 6 DRH, Bk. IX, c. 9, p. 290; Bularlo portugués. Inocencio III (1198 -1216 , éd. A. DE JESUS DE COSTA and M. A. FERNANDES MARQUES, Coimbra 1989, no. 199; MDH, no. 188, pp. 148-9; P. LlNEHAN, The Spanish Church and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century, Cambridge 1971, 18-9; P. FREEDMAN, «TWO letters of Pope Honorius III on the collection of ecclesiastical revenues in Spain»: Romische Historische Mittellungen 32-3 (1990-1) 37-40.
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Proyección internacional de la iglesia hispana Hispania Sacra 51 (1999) are the devil's works' examples are easily recalled^. Rodrigo's detraction, however, is of special significance and of a special kind. Why 'of special significance'? Because Rodrigo's De Rebus Hispanie has probably done more to shape how other historiaras, medieval and modem, view his homeland than any other single work. Why 'of a special kind'? Because Rodrigo is a first-rate manipulator of history and he knows omittance is the best way to detract from a person or event. Therefore, Rodrigo omitted from his history referente to the proceedings of the Fourth Lateran Council (November, 1215), where, we know, he had unsuccessfully tried to raise his primacy above an honorific dignity by accusing the see of Braga of being a nest of antipopes (referring to Maurice Burdinus) and implying that Santiago at Compostela was nothing but a tall-tale^. Poitiers 1966 Poitiers , 1124 LINEHAN, History and the Historians, 328-31. 9 DRH, BK.VIII, chs 1-13, pp. 259-78, provides the almost verbatim text for the account of the Las Navas campaign of the most widely disseminated later Medieval Hispanic chronicle: Primera Crónica General de España, ed. R. MENÉNDEZ PIDAL, Madrid 1955 , 684-705 (though A. CASTRO, The Spaniards: an Introduction to their History, California 1971 notes the increased nationalistic emphasis of the latter) -DRH (or, at least, its author) also inf orms LUCAS OF TUY, Crónica de España, ed. J. Puyol, Madrid 1926, 412-15; G. CIROT (ed. ) Innocent without affection and determined that the Papacy's best efforts would be altogether forgotten.
THE SIGNIHCANCE OF LAS NAVAS TO SPAIN
Las Navas was to be a very Spanish affair. 'SoU Hispani cum paucis ultramontanis' fought at Las Navas, Rodrigo famously declared, echoing the phrase 'Soli Yspani virtute sua obtinuerint imperium' used by the eminent canonist Vincentius Hispanus at about the time of the battle, when reflecting on what a poor show the Germans had made of empire^o. To be precise there were threevictors at Las Navas -God, the Catholic Faith and Spain. For the influential Bishop Lucas of Tuy, in his much-thumbed Chronicon MundU 'pugnant Hispani reges pro fide''^; Alfonso VIII later assigned his successinon 'meis mentis sed Dei misericordia et meorum auxilio vassallorum'^^; For Rodrigo, at Las Navas Alfonso VIII fought 'pro fi de Christi mori desiderans'^^ and even Sancho V I I of Navarre (1194-1234) turned up, bound 'in fidei catholice'^^ j^e matter was perhaps best summed up by Bishop Juan of Osma in the Chronique latine des rois de Castile: 'Mirabilis Deus in Sanctis suis qui tan mirabiliter providit Yspanie et precipue regno Castelle ut recedentibus ultramontanis gloria victorie belli famosi Yspanis non ultramontanis tribueretur'^^.
Though Rodrigo and his contemporaries recognized the importance of the attempt to internationalize the campaign and were fully conscious of their role in defending Christianitas, the participation of Rome was perceived as at best negligible, her success amounting to securing by Indulgences the ephemeral support of the treacherous Franci who had fled before the battle'^. As perceptimunicipal claimants produced their alleged forces along with the myriad aristocratic ancestors who allegedly participated in the battle, the support column might well have extended back to Santander'(J. 
THE LAS NAVAS OF HISTORY
Of course, the story of the battle itself, suffered from retelling. The victorious chroniclers had, as victors are wont to do, exaggerated the force of their enemy, depicted the Christiaii situation as desperate, and had been somewhat prodigal with the truth as regards the heroism of their men and the splendour of their triumph. The studies of Huici Miranda and Eslava Galán on the Muslim chroniclers ^9, which they shrewdly use in conjunction with their Christian counterparts, certainly reveal a fuller and rather different story of the conflict: the war was possibly provoked by Barcelona and Castile, accurately judging the weaknesses of their Almohad enemy^o. Al-Násir's chief advisor in North Africa, the highly capable Abd-al-Wahid, had warned him not to attempt the venture^^ Al-Nasir's army suffered from an extreme deficiency in organizá-is LINEMAN, History and the Historians, 296-7; IDEM, «Religion, nationalism and national identity in medieval Spain and Portugal»: Studies in Church History, 18 (1982) tion -in 1211 the Christian fortress of Salvatierra (the CastiUan Thermopylae) with a tiny garrison resisted a siege from the supposed might of the Almohad army for almost two months^^ i^ all, the Almohad army was on campaign for seventeen months, had its pay suspended, provisions denied and inevitably faced the pains of excepcional hunger and heat^^. To capital, Al-Násir, who was always a weak, pathetic and paranoid figure, a stammering academic, as Abd al Wahid al-Marákugl, who knew him, depicted him, had the governors of Fez and Ceuta decapitated on suspicion of mala dministration (for which act Le Toumeau accused him of 'unreasonable irritability') and executed his captain, the Andalusian Ibn Qadis, the defender of Calatrava, for surrender what was a hopeless position^"^. Needless to say that this was not good for morale, particularly not in an army where Berbers and Andalusian Muslims found unity an impossibility and co-existence a trial, and this is all to say that the Almohads had already contributed a great deal to their defeat before their conservative tactics further dented their chances on the battlefield^^. victory she refused to believe it until she had seen the letters from her father, so incredible did the whole thing seem^^. Yet at a more comfortable distance it cannot but appear that the Almohads were always struggling because not only did they have to fight on two fronts -when putting down rebellion in Africa facing Christian revolt in the north and viceversa-but on the Iberian frontier, they could not generally field sufficient forces to cope with more than half of the sector involved. The Empire was too vast to be effectively governed, far greater than the means then held to sustain it. The sheer increase in Christian population and resources compared with the inability of the Muslims even at the height of their power to resettle the frontier regions, the development of Christian political and economic institutions, a developing military technology, in part brought about by the increasing ties with transpyrenean Europe, suggest that there is ample reason to concur with the troubadour view expressed after Alarcos (a victory which, it has been pointed out, brought no territorial gains): 'Before we lost the Holy Sepulchre, and now we might lose Spain; for the first there are obstacles, but for the second we need fear neither sea nor wind'^0^
ROSCHER'S VIEW OF LAS NAVAS
Negligible participation in a commonplace victory, would not be well for a discussion on the papal contribution on the path to Las Navas. Yet worse is to follow since Helmut Roscher, who in his excellent Papst Innocenz' III und die Kreuzzüge is one of the few historiaras to deal specifically and seriously with the papal role in the Las Navas campaign, following the account of the Hispanist Gams (who followed Rodrigo), went a step further than Rodrigo in suggesting Innocent was not only ineffective in the campaign but a hindrance to 29 France, éd. M . BOUQUET and L. DELISLE, 25 vols, Paris 1738-1904, 19, 254 . http://hispaniasacra.revistas.csic.es it^^ Innocent's input was of negative value and Spain was not at the forefront of Innocent's desires. Excepting Celestine III (1191-1198) Innocent followed the traditions of the Twelfth Century Papacy and solely reacted to information that reached him from Spain. When Innocent sent his legate Rainier to Spain between 1198-1200, Rainier did not deal with the crusade against the Moor at all, but concentrated on the breaking of the ilhcit union between Alfonso IX of León and Berenguela. Innocent had put little effort into breaking any alliance between the King of León and the Moors or even securing Alfonso IX's neutrality. The initiative for the new crusade in 1210 came from Alfonso VIII and Prince Ferdinand of Castile; neither the plan of campaign nor the timing of it were Innocent's undertaking. Innocent did not help in the financing of the crusade. In Innocent's last letter to Alfonso VIII before the battle, his rousing cry read 'since all the world now lies in wickedness, we advise that if you can obtain a fair truce then you should take it, until the opportune time may come when you are able to beat the enemies of the Cross of Christ more easily'3^.
Letter of Berenguela to Blanche, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la
Certainly, some element of what Roscher argued is true. Nobody would deny that the financial burden of the enterprise fell upon the kingdom of Alfonso VIII and most especially the Castillan church, and nobody would suggest that the Pope in Rome could have much idea about tactics of warfare in the Peninsula and how to organize the diverse forces that participated. But it can be argued that Roscher emphasised the negative over the positive elements in the contribution of Innocent III and his predecessors in the Iberian crusades and extracted from their proper context expressions that can be better understood in terms of papal policy over a broader period; it is in the long-term institutional and ideological development of the Peninsula that the Papacy makes its contribution. Moreover, if we take it that Las Navas is an unsurprising triumph, then we can argue that the importance of Las Navas ultimately lies less in the battle itself than in the myth of Spanish unity attached to it. And to that myth, by giving to Spain, as MacKay suggested 'a semblance of peace and unity' at Las Navas^^, the Roman Curia over a broad period, and most especially Innocent III, had made a significant contribution to the Reconquista, 31 H. ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz HI und die Kreuzzüge, Góttingen 1969, 184-7; P. GAMS, Die Kirchengeschichte von Spanien, 6 vols, Graz 1956, 3, 111-154 ; cf. GOÑI GAZTAMBIDE, Historia de la Bula, 114; Unfortunately, G. MARTINI, «Innocenzo III ed il finanziamento delle Crociate»: ASRSP 67 (1944) 309-335, adopted a nonlatitudinarian approach to the Crusades: 'Per non parlare délia guerra di Spagna contro i Morj, le crociate predicate da Innocenzo IE furono tre: la quarta, la quinta, e, tra esse, la crociata contro gli Albigensi (p. 315). What is the Reconquista? It is not an easy thing to define, because it means, as it meant, a great many different things to many people. It is a myth, the myth that between the Arab invasion of 711 and the conquest of Granada in 1492, the Hispanic peoples constantly fought or intended to fight for a liberation of the Peninsula from the Moors, and a return to an ancient 'Híspa-nla' under a purif led Gothic dynasty. And most often to this myth a belief in a prelapsarian state is added. 'Hispania' was lost through sin, through the bad life of Christians; the Reconquista is an expiation (in the recurring phrase) 'pro peccatis nostris' and only through the assistance of God would the Church, people and kingdom be restored and Islam defeated. Both the Gothic and the religious elements of this myth had certainly existed from the end of the Ninth Century, if not before^"^.
R O S C H E R ,
But it is difficult to believe, in the absence of evidence, that the language of that false dawn in the reign of Alfonso III (866-910), was maintained throughout the Tenth Century when the Christian rulers of the north lived in the shadow of the magnificent caliphate of Córdoba and during that long period until and, nearly everywhere, beyond the mid-Eleventh Century, when there was no opportunity for Christian military conquest. It is difficult not in large measure to concur with those who far more fruitfully interpret the Reconquista in a dif ferent light and more valuably stress the economic, political and social developments of Hispanic society; who do not see God or religion or ideas motivating any advances that were made but rather a series of raids and skirmishes fought for temporal prizes and most of ten fought by Christian kingdoms that were very much individual and opposed to one another; who point to the Cid, a mercenary who fights for his daily bread and for either side. Christian and Muslim, and concur with Fletcher that 'the evidence -or lack of it-suggests that Spaniards of the eleventh and early twelfth century were not interested in a programme of Reconquest'3^. It was through legates in combination with the Iberian church, when it was wilHng and able, that the Papacy sought to bring about peace between the Christian kingdoms by emphasising what Spaniards knew but needed reminding of, that it was disharmony, the sin of division, that led to defeat. Herein lay the great contradiction and beauty of the papal argument in Spain -the papacy appealed to a higher sense of unity, a defence of the Regnum Hispanie (at a time when Hispanic chanceries were recognising the reality of the five kingdoms) and, beyond this, of the Christian Faith, and at the same time insisted on fragmentation, on protecting the rights of each individual ruler within his realm against the dominion of a greater kingdom (usually Castile) and it was this idea of a higher sense of unity in operation over an accepted fragmentation, that was the most successful articulation given to what Maravall called the unitary conception of the kingdom of Spain with the system of a pluraüty of kings^^.
THE PAPACY AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE RECONQUISTA
This is not to say that somehow the political and economic interests of the participants ceased to be the signif leant f actors in the development of the Peninsula: of course, they did not and they never would"^^. On the whole kings, and bishops (who were shaped in the kings' likeness), paid little attention to the mandates of legates and popes"^^; nor is it to forget that there were other 
CELESTINE III AND THE RECONQUISTA
Yet further setbacks accompanied renewed optimism. After the death of Alfonso VII (1126-1157) and the break-up of the Leonese-Castilian empire, this decimation of Spanish unity produced a further period of unsettled relationships between the Spanish kings. Effectively the wars among the Five kingdoms were almost continua in the last third of the Twelfth Century, and at least seventeen treaties in the half century after 1157 would not lead one to argue for a superabundance of love between the Christian kings^^ It was Celestine III, for half a century papal expert on Hispanic affairs, and twice legate in the Peninsula, who forcefully urged internar pacification^^. Zerbi has elucidated Celestinels role: It was primarily Celestine who insisted on the 1'reges Hispaniarum' as a body inside the spiritual Christian unity, and demanded from them an alliance and co-operation. In virtue of his office of pastor of the universal church, Celestine consideres it his duty to eliminate all discord and to guarantee tranquility, particularly at a moment, after the battle of Hattin (4 iuly 1187), when all energies ought to be put into defeating the Saracens. To fight the evil in Iberia, Celestine required a community of kingdoms that respected the laws of God and the laws of the Church and that, united in peace, conducted in solidarity the battle for the defence of Christianity^^.
51 MANSILLA, «Inocencio III y los reinos hispanos» (cit. n. 4), 13; MÉNENDEZ PlDAL, El Imperio Hispánico (cit. n. 34) F 180; LOMAX, La Reconquista (cit. n. 34), 147-161; GONZÁLEZ, Alfonso VIII (cit. n. 4), passim; BiSHKO, «The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest «(cit. n. 30), 412-417. 52 p . ZERBI, Papato, Impero, e 'Respublica Christiana' dal II87-1198 , Milan 1955 Celestine's plans came close to success. Through a series of councils, legations and bulls, he secured truces between the waning Christian factions, threatened with excommunication those kings who sided with the Moor against Christian powers, bolstered the prestige of Portugal and Navarre in particular against Castillan hegemony, encouraged the military orders in Spain to continue the struggle with the infidel despite the truces which existed between Christian and Moorish rulers, and was generous in his grants of the remission of sin for all those who fought against the Moors out of devotion^"^. But near was not enough. Celestine could not overcome the festering distrust between Castile and León and not victory but the battle of Alarcos in 1195, humiliation and a total disintegration into Christian civil war faced the ageing pontifP^. While Alfonso II (1162-1196) of Aragon responded to Celestine's renewed pleas with a pilgrimage for unity to Compostela^^, the Pope was left with a series of uneasy truces between the Christian kings, the knowledge that Navarre and León would rather side with the Moor than Castile, the knowledge that Castile and Aragon were intent on carving up Navarre, and that peace in Christian Hispania ultimately rested upon the incestuous marriage of Alfonso IX and Berenguela, that had been agreed in order to close the LeoneseCastilian war of 119757.
INNOCENT III AND THE RECONQUISTA
Innocent held the crusades as his primary occupation. A man of the very highest intellectual calibre, possessed of an indomitable will and a rare clarity of vision, without ever bearing arms the most passionate of the Crusaders, for 218, points to increased papal activity in Spain after Hattin; on this also RIVERA, La Iglesia de Toledo (cit. n. 4), 219-37.
^^ Papsturkunden in Spanien, 2: Navarra und Aragon, ed. P . K E H R , Berlin 1928, nos. 200-1, p p . 504-7, nos. 229-30, 588-93; Papsturkunden in Portugal, ed. C. E R D M A N N , Berlin 1927, nos. 127158, pp. 348-79 him the defence of Christianity was the vital aim. He was deeply convinced that the loss of Christian lands, in Spain and in the East, was the product of the Christian's sinful nature and their fondness for petty internecine warfare. In his famous encycUcal of 1198 for the Fourth Crusade, post miserable a plea for a renewed Christian world united in peace to achieve victory over the MusUm usurpers. Innocent showed his particular consciousness of this problem in Spain, of the disaster of Alarcos, and the importance of the Hispanic crusade in the spiritual unity that would bring about victory in the Holy Land: 'Where is your God to rescue you from our hands?' Innocent has the Muslims cry at the Christians. ' We have desecrated your Holy places and hold them in our hands after we have taken them by storm. We have broken the lances of the Gauls, brushed aside the assaults of the EngUsh, cut to pieces the forces of the Germans, and now tamed the Spaniards for a second time. Where is your God?^^, Innocent in Spain gave himself the same objectives as Celestine-peace and unity. How was this to be achieved? Essentially by using the resources and building on the strategy that the Papacy had developed over a century and a half. Firstly, peace and unity could only come through a society free ft'om sin -only a society free from sin could be properly organizad for war. Thus, for instance, the incestuous marriage of Alfonso and Berenguela, for the Hispanic rulers a logical dynastic strategy, was for Innocent a breach of Divine law and hence a means to defeat. The Christian people were scandalized, wrote Innocent to Archbishop Peter of Compostela, that now the sins that had led to such disasters and persecutions in the East were being transferred to the West^^. Thus in sending his legate, the saintly and erudite Cistercian Rainier of Ponza (an old friend of Joachim of Fiore and later Innocent's confessor) to break the marriage. Innocent was from his point of view, furthering the Reconquista: 'We have sent you to the kingdoms of Spain to secure peace between the rulers and dissolve iniquitous unions'^^. 58 Die Register Innocenz' III, I Pontifikatsjahr, Ed. 0. HAGENEDER and A. HAIDACHER, GrazKoln 1964, no. 336, p. 550; Potthast, 347; MPL, 214, 309; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz'III und die Kreuzzüge, 173-4 Secondly, peace and unity could only be achieved by maintaining the balance of power within the Peninsula through the respect for the validity of the younger kingdoms and, in turn, their acknowledgement of the necessity of papal over Castillan protection. It is what Gregory VII has in mind when he favours Sancho Ramírez in the 1070's^', and Alexander III in 1179 when he acknowledges Afonso Henriques as King of Portugal^^, and Celestine III when granting Sancho VII the title 'rex Navarrorum' in 1196^^. Innocent, rather than forming Spain around Castile, attempted to fortify the poHtical position of the different kings. For instance, this is partly why Innocent initially was so keen to protect Sancho VII of Navarre from the invasion of Alfonso VIII and Peter II in 1199, though Sancho's subsequent alliance with the Saracens rendered him indefensible^"^, and probably one reason why Peter 11 was crowned in Rome in 120465. Thirdly, peace and unity were to be achieved necessarily through the reform of the Iberian church. The reform of the Church was the essential prerequisite for the defeat of the Moor -the protection of the Church from the interference of the lay power and the support of the tradicional and newer mihtary orders was vital here; as was Roman interference in the internar disputes of the Church, such as that highlighted by the anonymous author of the Gesta Innocenta between Braga and Compostela, a result, like most of these disputes of trying to adapt preconquest structures to Reconquest situations, where Innocent successfully juggled with the problem of Compostela holding metropolitan rights over half the sees of Portugal and Braga rights over half the sees of Leon^^, or the notorious dispute between Huesca and Lleida in the East of the Peninsula, which had been going on long before either city had been recaptured from the Moors, and where Innocent imposed a solution that was so admirable judicious that undoubtedly neither party was able to question papal justice or, indeed, decide whether it had eventually won the game^^. These disputes drained both the spiritual and physical energies of the land, and this is why Innocent was so impatient to put an end to them.
The reform of the Church, the establishment of peace, the spiritual purification of Christendom -these were the essential elements in the promotion of the Hispanic Crusade.
INNOCENT III AND THE LAS NAVAS CAMPAIGN
It was with these objectives firmly in mind that Innocent acted in the Las Navas campaign. The exact circumstances of the initiation of the Crusade are not altogether clear. While Muslim raids along the Catalan coast may well have led to Peter U of Aragon's call to Innocent for support, it is probable that it was a war both Peter and the Castillan king wished to start^^. But what is clear is that, on 16 February 1210, Innocent responded to Peter H's crusading enthusiasm with Exemplo Miserabilis to Archbishop Rodrigo and his suffragans. From the outset of the campaign we find evident Innocent's view of victory in Spain as essential for success in the Holy Land and his immense caution after so many crusading disasters, as well as the persuasiva powersof a mature politician. As the Christian people have suffered a loss in the Holy Land of Christ, wrote Innocent ( ever mindful of Hattin ), now you must stand against the trickery of the pagans, at the time when it is fitting and expediente not allowing our Holy Land also to be profaned with the filth of their pollution. Since King Peter, ortodoxa fidei zelo succensus, was prepared to fight, the archbishop is to persuade Alfonso to emulate this pious proposal pro Christi nomine and undertake this task with similar devotion at the opportune time. If Alfonso would not go himself he should at least not impede his subjects who would receive a full remission of sins in promoting tantum Dei servitium^^.
No doubt Rodrigo did not address Alfonso VIII, the humiliated of Alarcos, in quite that goading manner, but the involvement of Castile was secure, and having received indication of the young Prince Ferdinand's desire to dedicate the first fruits of his military Hfe to Almighty God, in Significavit nobis o/10 December 1210 to the archbishops and bishops of Spain, Innocent sought the unity or neutrahty of the other kings and their subjects, who were not strictly tied by truces to the Saracens, to aid the first-bom son of Castile in exterminating the enemies of the name of Christ from the borders of His inheritance which they impiously occupied, for which work the Christian rulers would receive a full remission of sins and merit the glory of heaven, as would those who proceeded out of devotion from whatever country^o.
While in Cum personam tuam of 22 February 1211, Innocent rejected Alfonso's 'request for a legate to Spain because of the restlessness of the times (témpora impacata), and also probably given Alfonso's much criticised previous crusading track-record the Pope was doubtful of the success of the enterprise, nevertheless he promised he would satisfy the King's request at a 68 Above n. 20 and J. VENTURA, Pere el Católici Simó de Montfort, Barcelona 1960, 138. 69 j^Dfjj no. 416, p. 436 ; M. MACCARRONE, «Orvieto e la Predicazione della Crociata»: in his Studi su Innocenzo III, Padua 1972, 94. 70 MDHI, no. 442, pp. 472-3; Potthast, 4142; MPL, 216, 3 5 3 ; HUICI MIRANDA, Las Grandes Batallas, 228; ROSCHER, Papst Innocenz IIP und die KreuzzUge, 181 . Perhaps the letter was carried from Rome by a Trinitarian as they received a privilege confirming their spiralling fortunes at Burgos on 18/12/1210 (Documentación del Monasterio de la Trinidad de Burgos (1198 -1400 , éd. L. GARCIA ARAGÓN, Burgos 1985, no. 9, p p . 17-8) .
Proyección internacional de la iglesia hispana Hispania Sacra 51 (1999) (C) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Licencia Creative Commons Attribution (CC-by) 3.0 España http://hispaniasacra.revistas.csic.es more opportune time and reassured that if any king of Spain who had a peace with the King of Castile presumed to violate it while Alfonso was on campaign, he should suffer the ecclesiastical punishments consequent of such an action^ ^ Moreover, in Cum donationes of 12 April 1211, recognizing the ever present financiar troubles of the King of Aragon. Innocent revoked many donations that Peter had made before he reached his majority, since he considered it fitting to do so when considering the seriousness and expense with which Peter undertook the battle with the enemies of the Christian name, providing, of course, that Peter did not revoke donations he had made to the Church without an ecclesiastical judgement on the matter^^
In Quoad peticiones of 1 June 1211, Innocent forestalled Rodrigo's attempt to tie the primacy issue into the crusade. Rodrigo had hoped to gain a further confirmation of his privileges by using his most definitely important part in the organization and preaching of the -crusade to reconfirm the status of his see. In return Innocent accused the archbishop of a terrible lack of foresight; with the invasion of the Saracens now grave danger threatened Spain and this was hardly a fitting time to sustain a scandal in Spain concerning the primacy. Cum accepero tempus, ego iustitiam iudicabo, quoted Innocent from Psalm 74, stealing the moral highground''^.
In Recepimus litteras dolore of 31 January 1212, Innocent internationalized the crusade, calling upon the bishops of France and Provence to preach it to their people. Letters full of sadness and fear had reached Innocent from King Alfonso of Castile, since the Saracens had entered into Spain in vast numbers, and had besieged and occupied a castle of the Cistercian order called Salvatierra. Alfonso, fearing that the danger would increase if he did not act now, called for a campaign commencing in the Octave of Pentecost next, electing to die rather than see harm done to the Christian people Therefore Innocent ordered the prelates to exhort their people, granting them a remission of sins if they would aid Alfonso both with men and money. By doing this both bishops and people would merit eternal glory^'^.
In Cum personam tuam of 4 February 1212, having sent his condolences to Alfonso for the death of Prince Ferdinand (in Madrid in October 1211), and having informed Alfonso that he had initiated the preaching in France, Innocent developed one of his main crusading themes, that the humihty of the Christian before God would eventually triumph over the arrogance and evil pride of the infidel. 'Place your hope in the Lord your God', he addresses Alfonso, 'and humble yourself before Him who gives grace to the humble, and returns retribution to the arrogant; it is through the power that God gives to you, that you will magnificently triumph over the enemies of the Cross of Christ'. Despite this, considering the possible effect on morale of the loss of Ferdinand, and recognizing that apart from the King of Aragon, the support or even neutrality of the other kings was not secure, and seeing that war in the Midi, conñict in Germany, and interdict in England made outside support seem unlikely. Innocent offered Alfonso the option of saving face and negotiating a truce'^^.
Alfonso, however, was now determined to go ahead and in Quanta nunc nécessitas of 5 April 1212, to Rodrigo and Archbishop Peter of Compostela, Innocent made one final effort to secure peace. How great a danger now threatened Spain was best known to them and therefore they should persuade the kings of Spain to serve a peace and truce, especially during the imminent danger of the Saracen wars. If anybody (and here Innocent specifically ment ions Alfonso IX of León), should help in any way the enemies of the Cross of the Lord, who not only aspired to the destruction of Spain but also to other lands of the Faithful of Christ, they were to be subject to excommunication and their lands placed under interdicto. Moreover, if there were quarrels between the kingdoms, because of the immediate danger these were to be deferred to a more suitable time, and the royal procurators could then argue out their differences at the Papal Court, and Innocent would hear the cases personally'^^.
Innocent's final contribution prior to the battle was the Supplicatio Generalis, the call for a general procession in Rome on 22 May 1216, the Wednesday after Pentecost, the time originally set for the beginning of the Las Navas campaign and the time at which the Pope presumed the campaign was taking FERNÁNDEZ, Historia de España, Madrid 1970, 268-9 place^'^. Here more clearly than ever before we can witness the fusion of the ideology of the crusade with the movement of lay piety, with the call for vita apostólica, and it is here, prior to the Fifth Crusade, and also, as Dickson has recently written, significantly influencing the Children's crusade^^, that Innocent uses those liturgical skills that he had learnt before all else, to draw the Christian community into a mystical union that transcended tradicional political and ethnic considerations.
The procession was called for the peace of the Universal Church and the Christian people (pro pace universales ecclesie ac populi Christiani), especially so that God might be favourable in the war that was now supposed to be taking place between the Christians and the Saracens in Spain, lest the Lord should give his people up to mockery, and allow other nations to rule over them. There were to be three groups in the procession, essentially men, women, and clergymen, all proceeding in prayjer with devotion and humility and all going barefoot, each group taking a different route, but all meeting at the same place, the Lateran campus. Meanwhile, Innocent, with the Cardinal bishops and the papal chaplains, was to enter the chapel which is called the Sancta Sanctorum, and from there they were to process with a relic of the True Cross, to the palace of the cardinal bishop of Albano, in front of which Innocent was to preach a sermon to all the people. Later the Pope, clerics and laymen were to return to the Lateran basilica for the celebration of Mass before all who were able were to return home to undertake a severe bread and water fast. Through prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. Innocent insisted, the compassion of the Creator would be returned to the Christian people^^.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LAS NAVAS TO INNOCENT III
If, as tradition has it, the bones of the Cid rattled in their tomb on the eve of Las Navas^o, then we might say that the ghost of Celestine III would have breathed a sigh of relief on the evening of 16 July. The Christians had won, spectacularly, and Innocent III had been proved right. We do not know when he received the news, but it was by mid-October and probably well before. Innocent read out to the Roman people Alfonso VIIFs famous account of Las Navas and the taking of ubeda, and explained it to them in the vernacular. All gave thanks that God had given Alfonso the strength and virtue to restore the miracles of the Old Testament. Rather than being, as Roscher maintained, of little importante to Innocent, Innocent saw in the success of Las Navas a sure sign of Divine intervention in the World. God had shown His compassion upon Alfonso and upon the Christian people and poured out his anger on the races that did not know the Lord, and the kingdoms that did not know his name, humbling the strength of the arrogant and giving strength to those who trusted in the Lord 'Dominus virtutem populo suo dabit', reflected Innocent reminding Alfonso that God and not he had won the battle^ ^ Innocent was now convinced that the heretics who poisoned the Church were about to be destroyed. He threatened the heretical Milanese, in a tone that was, as Webb put it, 'both minatory and exultant', that crusading victorias in Provence and Spain showed a multitude of armies could not destroy the Lord^^. Moreover, the optimism generated by the victory developed in Innocent's mind the idea of a total liberation of the Holy Land. In Quia malor, the call to the Fifth Crusade of April 1213, in referente to Las Navas, Innocent said 'God has now given us this good sign that the end of the beast is approaching'^3. As Lomax demonstrated, Iberia now receded in its importante to Christendom^"^, though Innocent left open the option of organizing the war against the Moors if circumstances required^^.
THE FRENCH AND LAS NAVAS
One of the most significant contributions Innocent had attempted to make to Las Navas was in his efforts to internationalize the crusade. By Alfonso VIII's estimate about 62,000 and by Arnaud Amahic's about 40,000 French soldiers came to the crusade^^. Arnaud Amalric, Lucas of Tuy, Alfonso VIH, the Annals of Toledo, the Primera crónica general were all agreed that these knights had come because of the indulgences granted by the Pope^^. Unfortunately, only Arnaud Amalric and about 130 of these men took part in the battle^^. The exact reasons and circumstances in which the ultramontano crusaders departed may never be absolutely clear. Arnaud Amalric would have been in the best position to inform us (and everybody else since it was his victory letter to the Cistercian General Chapter which spread news of Las Navas throughout the Occident) but regrettably, though understandably, he opted for an embarassed silence^^. The Spanish eagerness to paint the French knights as cowardly and treacherous, and thus finally to put paid to all that nonsense about Charlemagne and all those ghastly chansons, does not altogether help^^. Certainly the terrain was diffcult and it was somewhat hot, as Alfonso VIII wrote to Innocent, tongue in cheek^^ But that is not enough in itself. One might reflect that for that same July 1212; Pierre Vaux-de-Cemay describes how, on the road to Carcassonne with Lady de Montfort, many of his companions fainted because of the violent heat of the summer and the difficulty of the route -yet few would suggest the Albigensian crusaders lacked mettle^^ Certainly the very different actitudes of the French and the Iberian forces on how to behave towards the MusHms (the former opting for slaughter, tended to see compromise as treachery and the latter f inding negotiation with the enemy much easier than with their allies)^^ and the lack of provisions played a great part in the abandonment^"^, but one should also consider that the French knights might have been slightly uncertain as to the purpose of the campaign, since Innocent and more so the Cistercian information network had preached the crusade very much more in terms of the loss of Salvatierra, from 1198 the major fortress of Calatrava, which was affiliated to Citeaux^^. We might not suspect this if Alfonso in his victory letter to Innocent had not been so insistent that the French knew that there was going to be a battle^^, and if Sancho VII, in the Navarrese account that reached his sister Blanche, had not maintained that at one point Alfonso VIII had tried to turn the Crusade upon Alfonso IX^'^. That was Navarrese propaganda, and Sancho VII only arrived after the French departed, but it is not too unlikely that it was the sort of rumour that was already circulating in the camp. Moreover, one must consider that papal action in the South of France, the papal humiliation of John, and the papally inspired conflict in Germany, meant there were attractions above home-cooking that motivated their departure.
THE PAPACY AND SPAIN
The greatest success and surprise for Innocent was that Arnaud Amalric, whose Languedocien legation had been extended in June 1210 to include the diocese of Pamplona^^, managed to persuade Sancho VI I of Navarre to join the kings of Castile and Aragon on the battlefield, despite long-held grudges and a prior assurance by Sancho that he would not come^^. The Muslims considered that the Roman 'Emir' had threatened to turn all the Christian forces Upon Sancho if he did not break his alliance with them^^^. Be that as it may, Innocent could not achieve a perfect quintet -war between Portugal and León in 1212, and the all too beautiful opportunity for Alfonso IX if Castile lost, saw to that; but crucially neither kingdom sided with the Moor and both did send knights to the battle^^i j^ the interests of the Christian Faith, the Papacy had helped to achieve a solidarity hitherto unknown. Though the Kings of León and Portugal could not make it at the time, they had arrived at the battle within a generation and have been there on and off ever since ^o^. That is importante For Spain, Las Navas was to represent the profound unity of the Spanish kingdoms, the essential epoch-breaking act of Spanishness, a myth of union, more important than the battle itself, and a myth in which the Papacy could necessarily play no part. But that the myth existed from the time and in the f orm that it did owed no little amount to Innocent III and his predecessors. The Cyprianic-Augustinian concern with the Unity of the Church and with Peter as symbol of that union, so important in Innocent's pontificate^o^, had been transporte into a Spanish context, and at least in this sense we might say that Spain was made, as much as Spain ever was to be made, by and not in opposition to North Africa.
